Introduction
Chukotko-Kamchatkan languages are traditionally analyzed as having an imperative paradigm featuring forms of all persons, thus constituting a typologically rare case of homogeneous imperative paradigm ([Auwera et al., 2005 ([Auwera et al., , 2013 ; ). In this paper, we challenge this view. We show that, in terms of their morphological makeup, the forms of command addressed to the second person are different from the forms of command addressed to the first or third person; and it is not clear whether the command to the third and first person are homogeneous, either. Our argument is based on an analysis of verbal morphology that has the following stipulations. First, we argue that only first person markers are allowed in a prefix agreement slot. This is in accordance with an observation that languages with inverse may be asymmetrical in terms of person agreement position relative to the verbal root (Chukotkan languages are indisputably inverse). All other prefixes may be analysed as mood markers.
Second, Chukchi is a highly agglutinative language. Under the analysis that argues for a homogeneous imperative paradigm, imperative forms are cumulative and express person other than first in the prefix position. Under the alternative analysis suggested below, the prefixes which appears in the imperative and jussive are re-interpreted as a pure mood markers. This avoids positing exceptional cumulation (cf. [Maltseva, 1998: 28] ) and exceptional second and third person prefixes.
A note in terminology is in place, for the sake of clarity. Below we will use the following terminology referring to cross-linguistic functional categories rather than language specific morphological categories: imperative for a second person volitional, i.e. a command to the addressee(s) (English Come in!); jussive for a third person volitional, i.e. command to a nonlocutor (English Let him come in!), and hortative for a first person volitional, i.e. a command / invitation to the addressee to take part in a common action (English Let's go in!) . This use of the terms follows the terminology that has been established and spreads since [van der Auwera et al., 2005] and [Dobrushina, 2011 [Dobrushina, , 2012 . When, however, we use terms such as imperative paradigm, we mean a combination of different cross-linguistic functional categories in one language specific series of verbal forms. Thus, the case of Hungarian or Lingala as analysed by van der Auwera represent cases of an imperative paradigm including all functional categories above (maximal system in their terms), while the case of Meadow Mari represent a case of an imperative paradigm including only the imperative and jussive categories [van der Auwera et al., 2005] .
Before proceeding, we will provide some general information on Chukotko-Kamchatkan.
The languages are spoken in Russia's Far East, on the peninsulas of Chukotka and Kamchatka. classification, see [Comrie, 1983] , [Fortescue, 2003] . Chukotko-Kamchatkan have been in a long-standing contact with Tungusic languages, and later with Russian. They are highly synthetic, with very prominent incorporation, polypersonal agreement combined with a relatively rich system of case markers, including circumfixes and inflectional reduplication. General descriptions of the languages are provided in [Bogoraz, 1922] , [Zhukova, 1972] , [Volodin, 1976] , [Dunn, 1999] , [Kibrik et al., 2004] etc. Several articles are specifically or to a great extent dedicated to the analysis of the imperative paradigm, including [Volodin, 1992] on Kerek and [Nedjalkov, 1994] on Chukchi.
In this paper, we only analyze prefixal marking in all languages, and only provide plural forms (while Koryak and Alutor also have dual). The reason for this is that the system of suffixes, including the suffix -la that distinguishes dual and plural forms, is complex and by and large does not interact with the system of volitional forms.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and discuss the traditional view on the Chukotko-Kamchatkan imperative as a "maximal system" in terms of [van der Auwera et al., 2005] . In Section 3, we discuss the evidence from intransitive conjugation and provide evidence against homogeneous interpretation of expression of the imperative, hortative and jussive categories. In Section 4, we discuss transitive conjugation, which provides a complication to our analysis, and suggest a solution. In Section 5, we discuss the problem of the "command" addressed to first person singular. In Section 6, we take a different, functional perspective to show that, from the viewpoint of the use of these forms, they are indeed aligned together, as could be implied from the homogeneity perspective. Section 7 is a summary of the discussion.
A homogeneous view on the Chukotko-Kamchatkan imperative paradigm
In the descriptive and typological treatment of Chukotko-Kamchatkan languages, it is a long established view that commands to the first (hortative), third (jussive) and second In [Birjulin & Khrakovskij, 1992] , imperative paradigms are defined on a functional basis (expression of imperative, hortative and jussive), and then non-second persons are formally compared to the second person. For the imperative paradigm to be morphologically homogeneous, the non-second person forms need to be dedicated (that means that the imperative should be the main function of these forms, otherwise a different formal category is argued to be used to express the function -cf. Russian идем which is morphologically identical to 1Pl indicative) and morphologically similar in the sense of the means they use (especially in terms of periphrastic vs. synthetic expression -a paradigm in which an imperative is expressed synthetically and jussive or hortative periphrastically does not count as homogeneous).
Ultimately, all dedicated synthetic volitional forms constitute a homogeneous paradigm.
Chukotko-Kamchatkan volitionals qualify as homogeneous paradigm.
Consider the following example from [Birjulin & Khrakovskij, 1992] . Turkologists include jussives in the imperative paradigm because these forms are by and large dedicated to expressing commands and are formally homogeneous; but they do not include hortative, because a form from the optative paradigm is used in this function. (Note that [Dobrushina, 2007] shows that the conventional Turkological term 'optative' stands for a dedicated hortative, so that the Turkic paradigm becomes homogeneous in this definition.) "…two imperative-hortative forms will be called homogeneous if they are formed using the same kind of morphological or syntactic means. The following parameters are relevant: (i) is the morphology or the syntax dedicated to the imperative or hortative? (ii) insofar as the strategy is morphological, is it of the same type in terms of distinctions such as base modification vs. affixation or, within affixation, is the relevant affix ordered in the same position relative to the base? and (iii) insofar as the strategy is syntactic, is it of the same type in terms of the presence of e.g. imperative-hortative particles or pronouns? Note that in determinations of morphological homogeneity, we allow zero
This definition is more specific in terms of 'similarity' of morphological means -cf.
(ii). According to this, slightly stricter definition, Chukotko-Kamchatlan imperative paradigm also qualify as homogeneous (see Table 1 ).
Finally, [Goussev, 2013: 224] defines heterogeneity as follows: "two forms are considered formally heterogeneous if they are distinct in a stronger way than the two respective forms in a non-imperative paradigm." Already in this sense, the paradigm is not fully homogeneous, because at least the distinction between the second and the third person is heterogeneous. All moods except imperative have the same pre-root marking in the second and third person. Imperative, on the other hand, has different marking (see Table 1 ). This means that at least imperative and jussive categories are differentiated in a way that is stronger than in other moods. (This observation is irrelevant for van der Auwera and co-authors who allow for zero expression, so that Goussev's definition seems to be the strictest of all).
Notably, the conclusions that different authors draw from homogeneity of the volitional paradigm are very different from an author to another. For Nedjalkov's line of research, Chukotko-Kamchatkan paradigm is a typologically rare example of homogeneous imperative paradigm ( [Volodin, 1992] on Kerek, [Nedjalkov, 1994] on Chukchi). [Dunn, 1999] For Kibrik ([Kibrik, 2001] , [Kibrik et al., 2004] on Alutor), the very homogeneity of the paradigm is an indication that this is not an imperative paradigm because, to him, imperative is a second person command by definition. He thus calls this paradigm 'optative'. His claim is based on two points:
(i) Imperative may only be applied to second person commands, because imperative includes locutory causation of the addressee; causation may not be addressed to the self or to an absent person. Obviously, this is a definitional / terminological objection; cf. also [Dobrushina, 2012] which amounts to a rare typological configuration anyway, whether we call it imperative or not.
In this paper, instead of solving the problem of the 'typologically rare configuration' by stipulating that the paradigm is not an imperative we intend to show that the so-called imperative paradigm is not morphologically homogeneous.
To our knowledge, [Maltseva, 1998] on Alutor is the only author who suggests a possibility of an alternative view on the imperative paradigm. She refers to the typological observations that assembling all volitional forms into one paradigm is cross-linguistically rare.
She then indicates that Alutor is very close to the agglutinative prototype. In all non-imperative forms, be it indicative or oblique moods, the first person is expressed by a prefix separate from the mood prefix (indicative is unmarked). Under the conventional view of ChukotkoKamchatkan, imperative prefixes are cumulative morphemes combining mood (imperative) with person. She argues that considering first, second and third person commands as separate moods solves this problem of 'unexpected cumulation' (in addition to placing Alutor in a typologically widespread language type). We add that, according to this logic, Chukotko-Kamchatkan imperative paradigm in a certain sense ceases to qualify as homogeneous at least in Goussev's definition of homogeneity. While Goussev himself classifies Chukchi as a language with a homogeneous paradigm, Maltseva's consideration may be counted as indication of heterogeneity in Goussev's own terms. Indeed, cumulative expression of a meaning may be considered as a stronger distinction than agglutinative one. [Heath, 2004 [Heath, : 1010 .
Intransitive imperative paradigm is not homogeneous
Let us assume that, outside the imperative paradigm, the only person marker that may appear in the prefix slot is first person. If we apply this to the imperative paradigm, the interpretation of the prefix markers is as follows. The prefix q-is the marker of imperative (imperative category rather than second person of the imperative paradigm; that is, command to the second person). The marker n-apparently expresses jussive, or third person command.
If we now look at first person non-singular, we see that, unlike first person indicative, the prefix slot is taken by mən-. The same form of the first person non-singular marker appears in conjunctive. In conjunctive, it is obviously a result of assimilation of /mət/ + /nʔ/ -> /mənʔ/, where /nʔ/ is the prefix of the conjunctive (we leave aside the question of whether this is a composite marker). Then, we could try to analyse the hortative /mən/ similarly as resulting from /mət/ + /n/. The Chukotko-Kamchatkan system then is reduced to a combination of imperative (second person command) and a system combining jussive and hortative categories. The latter is not unusual typologically (not very transparently, but this system is still present in English with let him / them for jussive and let's < let us for hortative), and certainly more common than the assumed homogeneous imperative paradigm. The following Two issues that remain are, first, the first person of P in the transitive paradigm in Alutor and Koryak, and the 'imperative' form of the first person singular, transitive or intransitive alike.
While the former is successfully -we think -resolved by a functional diachronic explanation (next section), the problem of the first person does not receive a satisfactory solution (Section 5).
Transitive paradigm in Koryak and Alutor
To a great extent, all discussion in Section 3 also applies to the transitive paradigm. Only first person indexes appear in the pre-root position; these are the same t-and mət-as in the intransitive. However, when second person (singular or not) or third person singular A acts on first person singular P (you / he on me), inverse strategy arise, with a special inverse prefix ina-.
This prefix serves as an indication that the action is directed towards first person, and also detransitivizes the verb, so that the A assumes the S role. Cf. [Kibrik, 2001 [Kibrik, , 2008 . Second person acting on non-singular first person requires special 'low agent' indexation, because the distance between the agent and the patient on the personal hierarchy is inverse and too big. Note that, in Alutor, this is not specific for imperative. The same phenomenon is observed across paradigms of all moods.
Another problem with second person Actors and non-singular P combinations is as follows. Above, we supported the idea of heterogeneity of the imperative paradigm by indicating that, except in the imperative, the pre-root part of the verbal complex may only contain first person prefix and is thus identical in the second and third persons. In the imperative, on the contrary, second and third person imperative are different (q-vs. n-). The fact that, in this special configuration of A and P, second person command is morphologically identical, in its pre-root part, to the third person command, undermines this claim.
We suggest the following solution, which is inspired by Kibrik's approach but is conceptually different -and simpler. We agree that second person agent acting on first person non-singular is a special configuration that requires, in Alutor, a special way of marking. What happens however is not using a low agent prefix which is also used in the third person but We agree with Kibrik that second person acting on first person non-singular receives a special treatment, distinct from first person singular P. We suggest, however, that what happened was grammaticalization of recruitment of third person forms.
To sum up this section, we suggest that, in addition to the use of the special antipassive inverse construction for 2A acting on 1SG.P, Alutor has developed a special system of demotion second person to third person when acting on 1NSG.P. Going from second person to third person command, one naturally comes to use a jussive form.
Kibrik treats ənə-as a combinatorial variant of the inverse suffix. This does not seem a plausible interpretation of this suffix. Unlike ina-, ənə-does not function as antipassive. The suffix slots are kept by suffixes indexing P. We tend to think the problem of the interpretation of ənə-is more a problem of interpreting Chukotkan inversion ( [Comrie, 1980] , [Kibrik, 2008] ) and the status of third person forms. Note that the problem of ənə-is not generated by our own approach to the imperative but goes beyond the imperative paradigm. To conclude this section, we argued that the absence of the imperative q-in the forms of second person command in some of the forms is due to reanalysis of the jussive forms. The problem that remains is that of the 'first person imperative' m-.
First person imperative?
So far we avoided any discussion of the first person singular 'imperative' form. The status of this form is unclear in both formal and functional sense. On the one hand, the form is isolated from the rest of the imperative paradigm, at least on the analysis that groups first person plural hortative with third person jussive. First person singular is never indexed by m-prefix outside the paradigm, and cannot result from any morphophonological process involving t-(regular first person singular prefix). First person plural, on the other hand, can be analysed into a combination of the first person non-singular (as in indicative) with the prefix n-. Note that the structure of the first person singular conjunctive is also unclear -if we isolate the subjunctive prefix nʔ-, the first person singular subjunctive is not expected to be prefixed with tʔ-(loss of nis not explained). On the other hand, first person singular imperative is a category which is crosslinguistically functionally unclear. [Dobrushina & Goussev, 2005] , for instance, suggest that in many languages with first person plural imperative category it is an invitation to a common action (as hortative is usually defined), thus inherently inclusive. While some languages are reported to use these forms in non-inclusive reading, the exact semantics is unclear (intentional?
propositive?). Thus, while English let us may be used with non-inclusive reference (apparently, unlike let's), Italian andiamo or Russian идем are strictly inclusive.
Obviously, first person singular cannot be inclusive. Its status in the plural depends on (un)availability of non-inclusive readings of the first person non-inclusive imperative (thus, a non-hortative reading), evidence we currently do not have. A common use of the first person singular 'imperative' seems to be intentional future, which puts the form pretty much outside the imperative paradigm anyway. In their independent uses, they compete with future tense markers.
It has been argued that there is no semantic contrast ( [Volodin, 1976: 250] , [Nedjalkov, 1994: 324]), but from our fieldwork experience with Chukchi we conclude that the form has an implicature of immediacy: The next section provides a preliminary comparative overview of the functional range of all person forms of the Chukotko-Kamchatkan 'imperative paradigm'.
Functional view on homogeneity
In this section we will provide a survey of semantics and use of volitional forms in
Chukotko-Kamchatkan and show that, from the functional point of view, they are in fact partially aligned. While we have argued that the imperative paradigm is not formally homogeneous, we can see that volitional forms of different persons can be used in similar contexts.
In their independent use, the semantics of the forms are different -to the extent that hortative, imperative and jussive are functionally different categories (see [Dobrushina & Goussev, 2005] on functional similarity between imperative and hortative and [Dobrushina, 2012] on functional similarity between imperative and jussive). Chukotko-Kamchatkan first person singular 'volitionals' are the outlier category as shown in Section 5 (compete with future tense). While first person singular forms are regularly used instead of future tense markers, we have no evidence whether it is possible for other volitional forms. [Volodin, 1976: 250] claims that for Itelmen it is true, but only provides examples with questions about the future ('What if I…?'). But it seems that modal questions is a special context in which all volitional forms in Chukotko-Kamchatkan can be used. Cross-linguistically, imperatives are rarely attested in interrogative sentences.
In Chukotko-Kamchatkan, on the other hand, volitional forms often occur in questions about permission or obligation. In (4) from Alutor, the first person conjunctive form is used alongside the imperative in the previous clause; cf. also (5) (both are from [Kibrik et al., 2004] {LC: Skis are in their own place} .
'Who will do anything to them? ' [13:31] Other such contexts are the uses of volitionals in negated future and purposive clauses that we are going to discuss now. Such uses are not attested in Itelmen, which has a different system of expressing negation; while for complex predication we simply do not have the relevant data. In Chukchi and Alutor, these uses are subjunctive-like, i.e. related to the domain of irrealis.
In Chukchi, negative polarity in the future requires qərəm to be used together with the volitional form, and it is the only way to express this semantics: 
Conclusions
Contrary to the view common both in the studies of Chukotko-Kamchatkan languages and in the representation of their data in typological literature, hortative, imperative and jussive do not represent a morphologically homogeneous paradigmatic category. The view of these forms as homogeneous partly results from the fact that the criteria of homogeneity provided in the typology of imperative systems are usually somewhat loose. A closer inspection of the Chukotko-Kamchatkan forms reveals that the structure of the verbal complex is incompatible with the idea of (non-zero) expression, in the pre-root position, of any person other than the first.
The prefixes usually taken to be person-mood markers are in fact pure mood markers, separating imperative and jussive functions into two different categories. On the other hand, a survey of the reports of the functions of these forms shows that they are functionally aligned in their secondary uses, especially in subordination. The forms are used in the same types of constructions in the irrealis domain, including purpose clauses, clauses of ethic or epistemic evaluation of future event, modal questions and negative future. The latter has a structure similar to subordination under evaluative adverb, so that the two functions may actually represent the same subordinative use.
